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21. Introduction
The world automobile industry is witnessing an unprecedented scale of
change in the 1990’s.  The end of Cold War structure, the rapid spread of the
information revolution and the international economic globalization.  The
wave of globalization has directly affected the international automobile
industry and has accelerated the global reorganization of it.  First, the
impact of globalization emerged in the financial and securities industries,
which experienced the Big Bang in the 1980’s.  Then it spread to the fast
growing information and communication’s industries.
  Now the automobile industry is no exception.  The automobile industry
was, especially in advanced countries, primarily a national industry, no
matter how internationalized its business content developed.  It has been a
representation of a nation’s manufacturing industry serving the best
interests of the nation.  Take trade disputes concerning automobiles for
instance.  It has been discussed as being related to the arguments of what
should be the correct way to handle automobile trade, the balance of trade,
and the job security for a countries labor force.  The automobile industry
also has a wide range of related industries such as the component or
material industries, on which it has had a great impact at an entire national
level.  In this sense, the industry was the national industry.  Because of this
background, automobile manufacturers in advanced nations constructed
their management strategies that centered on their own country.  And their
overseas strategies tightly connected to the domestic strategies and had a
strong tendency to compliment them, no matter how heavily they depended
on their overseas business and exports.  Therefore car manufacturers’
competitiveness was closely related to how superior their competitiveness is
in their domestic markets.
  Against this backdrop, especially in the 1980’s, and before the 1990’s when
globalization rapidly developed, the automobile industries competed with
each other at a nation-to-nation level.  In addition to that, we still remember
that the Japanese automobile industry was the one that grew rapidly by the
so-called lean production method and which had grave impacts on the
European and American automakers.  We have to explicitly state that the
lean production revolution ignited reforms taking place in the Western
countries.  Under the reforms, automobile manufacturers in those countries
executed restructuring several times although their stance and approaches
might be different.  They carried out drastic reforms that ranged from their
product development to production systems in factories and to the systems
used for component purchases.  This trend led to the globalization in the
1990’s.
  Needless to say, economic globalization means a free and rapid flow of
management resources (people, goods, money and information) beyond
national borders.  Business activities expand beyond the framework of one
nation and dynamically develop everywhere in the world as far as markets
3exist.  We can observe this trend in sections of the automobile industry such
as; a) product development, b) supply systems including factory locations, c)
systems to purchase from the suppliers of parts, components, intermediary
material and raw material, d) production systems at factories, e) automobile
sales and distribution systems although they may be different region by
region.  All of these are not contained within the framework of a country,
but they have been developed into a global base.  It must also be pointed out
that they are integrated under a global management strategy.  Therefore it
is now possible to clarify the direction of global business.
  This globalization of the automobile industry not only enables the business
procedures stated above to take place, but also makes them necessary
conditions for the automobile manufacturers to survive in the international
arena whether or not they conduct mergers or amalgamations.  It is because
the economic globalization has made human and financial resources global
as well.
  Against this very background, the recent reorganization of the global
automobile industry is developing.  Some processes of reorganization are
putting major focus on scale economy at the global level and attracting
public attention in cases like Daimler – Chrysler and Nissan – Renault.
Other manufacturers like Honda are promoting their own global strategies
by themselves.  Therefore the directions of globalization are not necessarily
monotonous.  Regarding this phenomenon, there is often an argument that
there will only be about 5 automobile manufacturers in the world who
survive further development of the global reorganization.  The argument
points out that manufacturers who are not members of the so-called 4
million unit club, (which consists of makers producing 4 million units or
more annually) probably will not survive alone. Considering this, there is a
fundamental question for a simple argument dealing with scale merit as the
only measure that can decide if your big enough or if your smart enough, to
develop superiority in the automobile industry in the age of globalization.
Before studying the argument, I would like to clarify why global
reorganization took place in the automobile industry in the first place.  Then
I will suggest that there is an alternative to mergers and amalgamation,
which single-mindedly pursue scale merit.  The way could be a network
style tie-up among manufacturers while they maintain their own corporate
identities.  Furthermore, I will discuss the structural change of the
automobile component industry that is directly affected by the automobile
industry’s global reorganization and environmental strategies of the
automobile technology.
42. Global reorganization of the automobile industry and
the direction of the global strategy
In the discussion about the globalization of the automobile industry, it is
necessary to focus on two incidents that have had a decisive impact on the
direction of the globalization on a corporate level.  One is the merger
between Daimler and Chrysler that took place last year.  They are powerful
automobile makers representing Germany and the USA respectively.
Another is Ford’s global strategy, Ford 2000 aiming at the 21st century,
which was announced in 1993.
  Let us take a look at the mega-merger between Daimler and Chrysler.  The
impact of the merger on the automobile industries in the world was huge.
We can see how large the impact was when understanding that the mega
merger triggered a series of tie-ups beyond national borders.  For example,
the alliance type tie-up between Nissan and Renault, which was announced
this year was directly triggered by the D-C (i.e. Daimler-Chrysler: the
abbreviation will be used hereafter) mega-merger.  This fact was revealed by
an interview I had with the leaders of Nissan.  After this merger, Ford
snapped up the passenger car department of Volvo.  We also witnessed the
start of a tie-up negotiation between Fiat and Mitsubishi. (However, it has
only reached partial cooperation for joint production using the partner’s
factories.)  Even among manufacturers that already had joint relationships
like Toyota-Nissan, Daihatsu, and GM-Suzuki, they all have increased their
stock holding ratios, which is part of their corporate groups’ global
strategies.  The D-C mega merger directly brings about this increasing
tendency.
  Now, what was the background that caused the D-C mega merger?  It was
unthinkable about 10 years ago that the major automobile manufacturers
would merge beyond national borders.  True, there have been buy-ups of
automobile makers across national boundaries in the past.  For example,
Renault in France once bought up the number four U.S. manufacturers;
American motors (although it was sold to Chrysler in 1987).   Germany's
BMW bought Rover, the only nationalistic manufacturer in the U.K.  It was
in 1989 when Ford bought Jaguar, a manufacturer of luxury cars in the
U.K.  However, those who were merged were niche makers producing only
300,000 cars per year at the most.  The D-C mega merger was the first one
in history that involved 2 huge players producing from 1.2 million to 3
million cars annually.
  Then what was it that enabled such a mega merger to take place, the
unthinkable 10 years ago?  I must point out here that many research
organizations expected from the early stages that automobile manufacturers
of the world would take the path of reorganization.  In fact, France's
ministry of economy and industry stated in 1982 that the almost 30
automobile makers in the world at that time would be converged into 6
companies within 10 years (1).  It was proven wrong in the past 10 years
5because of the emergence of some new aspects in the automobile industry’s
competition, which could not be judged by simple scale merit in the 1980’s.
First of all, the Japanese automobile industry began to push its
international competitiveness by using the lean production revolution in the
1980’s.  Because of the lean production revolution, the reorganization of the
existing 11 automobile manufacturers was put off.  At the same time,
European and American automobile companies learned from the lean
production revolution while they strove to restructure themselves.  The
situation did not offer any conditions for the companies to begin to think
about mergers or amalgamations.  Ten years ago we saw the peak of such a
movement.  Not only Japanese manufacturers but also Western
counterparts were making all-out efforts to survive independently by
reforming their corporate characteristics.  They had no intention to embark
on any mergers or amalgamations.
  As we have discussed, there were some changing aspects in the
competition of the 80’s.  This does not mean that competition in those days
was global, crossing national boundaries as it is now.  It was international
competition of the automobile industries based on their own nation or
region.  However, swift progress in the economic globalization provided a
decisive condition where globalization strategies were established.  Under
these strategies, the automobile industry pursued product development and
component purchases at a global level.  It also aimed at arranging factory
locations and supply systems in a global scale.  In addition to the movement,
several other factors have underlined the necessity of global strategies
toward the 21st century.  These factors include; a) expansion of middle and
eastern European automobile markets due to the end of Cold War, b) Asian
population super powers, China and India joining in the global market
economy, c) emerging automobile markets in such regions as Asia, Central
and South Americas (2).
  The Asian automobile market is temporarily suffering from a dramatic
plunge in demand due to the economic crisis that started 2 years ago.
Despite the harsh situation, the dormant market has a large potential,
which makes it indispensable for automobile makers to come up with an
Asian strategy from a global point of view.  In any way, new global
strategies to cover emerging markets such as Asia have drastically changed
the existing approaches.  Those past approaches in the 80’s put emphasis on
the markets in advanced nations and were more concerned about the
regions and the nations where automobile manufacturers were located.
  Through this process, linkage between advanced nations’ markets and
emerging markets has shown progress thanks to emerging markets’
entering into the international arena.  What is important is that the
automobile makers of the world don't have a chance to survive in the future
if they function only within one country acting as a regional maker.  A
manufacturer can maintain stable conditions when it grows from a regional
maker into a global one.  This is possible only when the manufacturer
6establishes a comprehensive global strategy keeping sight of Asia, Eastern
Europe, and other European regions, North America, Central and South
American; in short all the markets on earth.  It is because supply and
demand trends of automobile markets differ from region to region and offset
each other.  The companies balance the profits throughout these markets by
compensating for losses and fluctuating exchange rates.
  Figure 1 shows comparisons between the worlds major regions’, production
capacity and their utilization per region.  The figures change at different
points of time depending on the region.
  The D-C mega merger was the very phenomenon-taking place against the
backdrop stated above; where automobile markets and the conditions of
competition became global.
Figure 1  Industry Structure: Global Overcapacity
Capacity vs. Sales by Region1998
Source: J. D. Power & Associates Estimates
Reproduced in part by author
  Amid this background, both Daimler and Chrysler can be said to have
aimed not at a global strategy of making themselves into global auto-
makers, but instead at entering into a mutually beneficial alliance that
made the best use of each company's strengths. Both companies realized
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7that being an independent global automaker included a lot of risk. Chrysler,
a large-scale regional manufacturer centered in North America, is dominant
in the under $23,500 per unit passenger vehicle segment which includes
mini vans and SUVs. On the other hand, Daimler is known as a medium-
scale niche manufacturer (3) with a worldwide reputation for its luxury
vehicles. However, in terms of market and production bases, Daimler is a
regional manufacturer centered in Europe.
  Thus, the natural conclusion was that neither of these manufacturers
alone would have faced numerous hardships as global competition rapidly
heated up. Especially for Chrysler, even as a regional manufacturer in
North America, it would have been necessary to strengthen production
capacity to 10 million units And to begin to make huge new investments in
engines and components (4). Competing as a global auto maker through
building the weak European, Asian and South American markets while at
the same time shouldering the risk of huge investments that would have
been no easy matter. At the same time, Daimler could not have become a
global automaker in the growing Asian, Central American and South
American markets solely on the strength of the worldwide brand image of
their luxury vehicles. This is even truer for the North American market. It
would have been indispensable to add both economical passenger cars and
mini vans/SUVs to their line up.
  In this way, these two manufacturers with very different values, cultures
and characteristics took action to become part of a large-scale cross-border
alliance in order to survive in the face of stiff global competition. This was
the end of the age of single-country mergers and reform, which had been
taking place over and over again in Europe.  Figure 2 shows the mutually
supportive effects of the Daimler and Chrysler alliance.  Figure 3 shows the
average price range and transitions in production volumes for passenger
vehicles before and after the merger.  Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the ratio of
light vehicles sold by region for each company before the merger and
together after the D-C merger.
  One more aspect, which we shouldn't overlook, is the existence of a global
financial system, which makes large-scale global alliances possible. With the
big bang proceeding in the financial and stock markets, automakers and
other companies, which act globally, do not need to rely on domestic bank
investments, bonds and stocks to raise funds. These days, instead they aim
to raise funds through global financial institutions and stock markets and
systematically boost the public estimation of the company through high cash
flow figures and EVA.
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9Figure 4  Mercedes-Benz 1997 Light Vehicle Unit Sales By
Region
Source: Shreder’s Report, p.5.
Reproduced in part by author
Figure 5  Chrysler 1997 Light Vehicle Unit Sales By Region
Source: Shreder’s Report, p.6.
Reproduced in part by author
Figure 6  DaimlerChrysler 1997 Pro Forma Light Vehicle
Unit Sales By Region
Source: Shreder’s Report, p.6.
Reproduced in part by author
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  As we can see in figures 7 and 8, the production and cash flow rankings for
automakers around the world, a wide gap has emerged in cash flow among
the main manufacturers. Even manufacturers high on the production list
have rather low cash flow.
Figure 7  Global Production Ranking, 1997
Source: Automotive News Yearbook
Reproduced in part by author
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Figure 8  Consolidated Cash Flow Ranking
Note: Includes categories other than automobiles
Source: Prepared by ING Barings Securities
Reproduced in part by author
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  Especially prominent are Japanese manufacturers such as Nissan and
Mitsubishi. This is due mainly to the combined effect of the domestic
recession in Japan and the economic crisis in Asia, with the collapse of the
Japanese financial system, especially the stagnation of the main banking
system, which is also contributing to the problem. In contrast, cash flow for
GM, Ford and Chrysler are all high. However, this amount includes
revenues from their respective finance companies, which manages huge
amounts of capital and reserve funds for employee health insurance.
Differences in accounting systems are also responsible for the wide
discrepancies between Japan and the US.
  Regardless, one important factor here is the symbolism involved with GM,
who pride themselves on being the number one automaker in the world, and
being surpassed in terms of cash flow by Ford. With the expansion of
globalization, shifts in competitive power ranking from the point of cash
flow have intensified in comparison to that of car production, sales and even
market share, with unexpected changes occurring to the ranking system.
Competitive power in terms of cash flow is undoubtedly affected not only by
domestic competitive power but global competitive power as well.
  It is easy to see that manufacturers such as Ford and VW with increased
levels of cash flow have discernible global strategies, which have been
working effectively. In this way, the importance of global strategies has
been highlighted, regardless of participation in alliances or mergers, and
survival among automakers in the 21st century will depend even more
heavily on effective skills in designing global strategies. However, the
economy of scale theory is still often used in discussions concerning cross-
border alliances and tie-ups.
  Here, we would like to consider the background of the quick move toward
large-scale international alliances and mergers. Foremost was the
introduction of innovations based on digital design, which facilitated the
sharing of global platforms as computer assisted engineering (CAE) and
digital CADCAM came into common use. The number of platforms,
traditionally different for each model, could be reduced and the industry
unified, thus lowering the barriers between manufacturers. This reduction
in the number of platforms and increased common sharing is not new. Some
manufacturers in the west had already embarked on this path as early as
the first half of the 1980s, with some Japanese manufacturers starting in
1992 or 1993 during the second big strengthening of the yen and
restructuring period that followed the collapse of the bubble economy.
Today, reduction of the number of platforms has become a common trend
worldwide.
  For example, GM reduced its more than 36 platforms by half and is aiming
at 8 platforms for the near future, and Toyota and Nissan plan to reduce
their more than 20 platforms to 8 platforms. Honda, which forestalled
introducing common platforms, is aiming to unify product development with
a flexible world platform. Comparing current production numbers per
13
platform in North America, small trucks and mini vans manufactured by
the Big Three occupy the top 8 positions. Two basic types of small trucks
account for the highest production number per platform at more than 1
million, and even the lowest production number is up around 450,000.
  As for Japanese cars in North America, the Honda Accord and Toyota
Camry rank 9th and 10th respectively. Production is 440,000 and 430,000
per platform. A simple comparison reveals that small trucks, one of the
American manufacturers' strong points, hold double the scale merit
compared to Japanese passenger vehicles. This is a source of high profits,
now at around five or ten thousand dollars per unit.  (Refer to Fig. 9)
  Therefore, unification of platforms brings a rise in production numbers per
platform and a reduction in costs as the scale merit goes up. Taking this one
step further, big mergers will bring increased scale merit by establishing
common platforms between the manufacturers involved.
  Moreover, there is a movement to unify basic components such as engines
and transmissions in addition to the unification and spread of common
platforms. For example, Ford is developing a global engine series with
annual production of over 2 million. This tendency is also part of the scheme
or concept in which mergers or alliances are being promoted.
14
Companies Main Model 
Production
Unit
 0   500,000   1,000,000
 1 GM Chevrolet C/K truck, Other 6 1,125,755 187,626
 2 Ford Expedition, Other 3 1,088,229 362,743
 3 Ford Rabgler, Other 4  858,918 214,730
 4 GM Buick Regal, Other 7  739,446 105,635
 5 Chrysler Dodge Caravan, Other 5  627,112 125,422
 6 GM Chevrolet S10, Other 5  596,428 119,286
 7 Ford Taurus, Other 2  495,734 247,867
 8 GM Chevrolet Cavalier, Other 2  454,986 227,493
 9 Honda Accord/Accura CL 2  446,829 223,415
10 Toyota Camry/Avalon/Sienna 3  431,811 143,937
11 Honda Civic 1  355,633 355,633
12 GM Pontiac Grand Am, Other 3  345,980 115,327
13 Toyota Prizm/Corolla 2  318,831 159,416
14 GM Buick LeSabre, Other 3  300,759 100,253
15 Ford Windstar 1  292,687 292,687
16 Chrysler Jeep Grand Cherokee 1  278,453 278,453
17 Ford Escort/Mercury Tracer 2  277,454 138,727
18 GM Chevrolet Malibu, Other 2  273,449 136,725
19 GM Saturn SL/SC 1  271,471 271,471
20 Ford Crown Victoria, Other 2  228,616 114,308
21 Chrysler Cirrus, Other 3  226,977  75,659
22 GM Chevrolet Venture, Other 3  222,483  74,161
23 Chrysler Dodge Ram 1  212,955 212,955
24 Chrysler Dodge Neon/Primos Neon 2  205,448 102,724
25 Chrysler Eagle Vision, Other 4  203,988  50,997
26 Ford Econoline/Club Wagon 2  200,509 100,255
27 Chrysler Dodge Dakota/Durango 2  200,174 100,087
28 Chrysler Jeep Cherokee 1  184,888 184,888
29 Ford Contour/Mercury Mistoque 2  179,830  89,915
30 GM Chevrolet Astro/GMC Safari 2  170,804  85,402
Note: * Number of models  ** Units produced per model
In the North American market, production capacity per platform exceeds one million per year for
GM's C/K Pickup, Sierra and Suburban and Ford's F-series Pickup and Expedition. These models
have the same base as full-sized pickups and are representative of the SUV segment. This is more
than double the scale merit of Honda's Accord and Acura CL at 447 thousand units and Toyota's
Camry, Avalon and Sienna at 432 thousand units. Thus, it is said that profits per unit have reached
about 5,000 for pickup trucks and 10,000 for SUVs.
After the success with chassis', GM and Ford are expanding scale merit through unification of product
variation in the field of basic components such as engines and transmissions. For example, Ford is
developing a global engine series that will exceed 2 million units per year after 2000 and GM is
planning to unify its power train on a worldwide basis.
Figure 9  Units Per Platform (North America)
Source: Prepared by ING Barings Securities from Automobile News
Reproduced in part by author
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Table 1  Component Procurement Strategies (Big 3)
General Motors Ford Chrysler
Key word "Best Worldwide Supply" "FORD 2000"
"Greatest Minimized Costs
in the World"
Reduced number
of suppliers
5000~6000 main component
manufacturers in 1988 were
greatly reduced to
2500~3000 in 1990, with
further reductions planned
for 2000 and beyond.
Demanding further
development of module
components
Aim at reducing the number
of main component
manufacturers from 2010
companies to 1000 in ten
years.
The reduction of the number
of component companies in
North America from 1500 to
1000 by the year 2000. From
these, 180 manufacturers
are to receive two-thirds of
future component orders.
Demanding further
development of module
components
Reduction from 1500 main
component manufacturers at
present to approximately
150 by the year 2000.
Goal of reduced
component
supply costs
Introduction of PICOS
30% cost reduction was
achieved within three years
of 1992. This program will
continue into the future.
Requesting a 5% annual cost
reduction and 20% overall
cost reduction for the four
years since 1995.
Introduction of the SCORE
program since 1989.
Cooperation with suppliers
to reduce costs.
A reduction of $2.67 billion
by 1996 and overall target of
$9.8 billion by 2001.
Goal of reduced
development
costs
PICOS was introduced with
the aim of reducing costs by
30% within three years of
1992. PICOS was later made
into a regular program.
Requested improvements
aimed at "zero defects "
during the 1996 suppliers'
meeting.
Aiming at cutting total costs
for the year 2000 back to the
1995 level through a product
development-led system
concentrated at five vehicle
centers.
Shortening the development
period from 33 months to 24
months.
25% reduction in
preparation time for
manufacturing through the
introduction of the CAM
system, accompanied by
reductions in related costs.
Aiming at zero annual
defects per model.
Reduced number
of platforms
Reduction from 25 at
present to a total of 8.
Reduced number of engine
and transmission types
Reduction from 24 at
present to a total of 16.
Increasing model variations
from five types to eight types
per platform.
Reduction from 30 basic
engine structures at present
to a total of 14 by the year
2004.
Integration of 7 or 8
platforms
Expanding production per
platform by integration of
the platforms as well as
increasing the production
capacities.
Movement away
from intra-
company
component
operations
Delphi Automobile Systems
was established following
the detachment of GM ACG
(intra-company component
operations) in 1994. Delco
Electronics was then taken
over at the end of 1997. An
increase from 30% in 1996 to
50% by 2002 is planned for
sales percentages excluding
GM North America
Operations (NAO). It is also
said that a public stock
offering is highly likely in
1999.
Visteon Automobile Systems
was established after intra-
company component
operations were detached in
November 1996.
Plan to increase reliance on
sales outside of Ford from
10% in 1996 to
approximately 20% between
2000 and 2002.
Promote out-sourcing except
for main components such as
platforms and power trains
through the spin off and sale
of Acustar (Intra-company
component operations).
Source: Prepared by ING Barings Securities from Automobile News, etc.
Reproduced in part by author
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  One more point related to global mergers and cooperation is that global
component supplies make possible a reduction in costs for component
supplies through narrowing down the number of component manufacturers.
Unifying component supplies while advanced system unification also
reduces costs by shaving the number of components and the manufacturing
processes using module systems. Surely, a quick look tells us that mergers
and cooperation bring about lower costs for component supply and promote
module systems because of the resulting concentrated purchase of
components and increased buying power.
  Table 1 shows procurement strategies for The Big Three. Included are how
the number of suppliers is being reduced, goals for reducing costs related to
component supply and development, reduction of the number of platform
types and separation of intra-company component operations.
  In this way, a global system of vehicle development and component supply
has become possible. This paved the way for later endeavors to establish a
global system of production, supply, distribution and sales.
  Moreover, further impetus to develop global strategies resulted from the
increased importance of forming environmental strategies for handling such
issues as CO2 reduction and recycling, which will strongly influence
competitive power in the automobile industry during the 21st century.
  The above-mentioned development of global strategies and conditions
which made this possible coincided with the background and timing of the
Daimler-Chrysler large-scale alliance. However, full-scale global
competition in the form of competitive strategies among automakers was set
off by the announcement in 1993 of the Ford Project 2000, Ford's flagship
global strategy. More than anything, Fords Project 2000 signaled the start
of an era of global strategies in the worldwide automobile industry and has
played a leading role in global strategies with an eye on the 21st century.
  Under President Trotman, Ford set out a bold global strategy, but the
basis for this strategy was the recognition that the globalization of people,
things, money and information was rapidly proceeding. The building of
corporate culture recognition is ultimately necessary to keep up with the
speed of change (5).  Therefore, Ford promoted a strategic unification of the
Ford family including Ford Europe, Mazda and Jaguar and infusing a
common global vision. Details of this strategy are as follows: Global
unification of automobile chassis' and platforms was promoted by carrying
out worldwide unification of the development system. Then, related to this,
a world car concept was established with the Mondeo and Mystique light
vehicle series. This was the springboard for the debut of a basic world car,
the recently announced KA series.
  Also, overlap which had previously taken place in development of similar
concepts in North America, Europe and Asia was ceased and five vehicle
centers were organized and development functions concentrated as much as
possible in Dearborn. A strategy was set forth to organize the division of
labor and cooperation among North America, Europe and Asia under a
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global development system. This was carried out mainly in development
centers in North America with the introduction of common platforms,
common components and the global engine series. Moreover, under Ford
2000, the global strategy for component supply shown earlier was set forth.
Ford promoted the reduction and systematization of suppliers,
establishment of module systems, independence of Visteon, the intra-
company component operations and growth of global suppliers. In the
process, bench marking was thoroughly implemented by setting up a
database of supplier capacity (cost competitiveness, price competitiveness,
time for delivery and technological/developmental ability). In this way,
groundwork was boldly laid for global sourcing, referred to as the best
locations and supply worldwide.
  This global strategy of Ford 2000 was formed with farsighted vision and
was very dynamic in nature. As you can recognize from the key words,
"Think globally, act locally with agility," in planning their world car, Ford
carefully considered the compatibility of products (compatibility to local
market) while taking into account complications surrounding local market
needs and numerous market changes.
  At the time, Ford 2000 was considered too radical and bold a concept and
specialist in the US criticized the project as being too futuristic and carrying
too great a risk. Some people saw the plan as lacking in reality and being
some sort of moral boosting tactic to spur on President Trotman's corporate
culture reforms.
  Additionally, various conflicts and confusion occurred within the company
organization after the actual implementation of the strategy. The world car
concept was reconsidered and the direction of development sharing was
slightly altered with Europe. However, it later became clear that this bold
global strategy would succeed when looking at increases in Ford's share of
the world market, improved cash flow and reduction of costs related to
development and component supplies.
  In an interview at Ford headquarters, I discovered also that Ford Project
2000 was not aimed solely at strategic global preparations. In order to even
out the bureaucratic organization and make Ford even more active,
promoting reform of the corporate culture at Ford was aimed not only at
reform of the mentality within the company but also at making the best use
of information technology.  These reforms ranged from full implementation
of databases, to simplifying management procedures and organization. The
main point of the project was to speed up business procedures and decision
making (6).  This type of advanced global strategy together with reform of
corporate culture strengthened Ford's presence in the worldwide automobile
industry and led to the establishment of global strategies by many other
manufacturers such as VW and GM. In a way, this movement became the
primer for worldwide reform as represented by the Daimler-Chrysler
alliance and the Nissan-Renault merger.
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3. The role of scale economy in the global reorganization
and the production systems of various model in various
quantities
We have studied the process of how the global reorganization took place.
The global strategies that received all the attention, was the Ford example,
Project 2000 which triggered the attention to global strategies.  The global
strategies have triggered the global reorganization and have now become
the requirements for the survival of the future automakers worldwide.
There are theories to follow regarding the global reorganization based on
the scale economy.  Thus, the word in the international automobile industry
and among journalists is that only the few automobile companies with
annual production of 4 million cars or more will remain in the future. If this
annual production of 4 million cars is the magic number, merger fever is a
natural phenomenon among many automobile manufactures and
management. Still, the question remains if simply the scale of economy
theory can explain the globalization of the worldwide automobile industry?
Can the changing world automobile market really be explained so simply
under the scale of economy theory?
  If the future international automobile market continues to undergo
complicated and diversified changes and movement in demand continues to
roller coaster depending on the region and time without synchronizing such
changes by region, there are theories other than a simple scale of economies.
That is to say, other policies include lowering the break-even point for a
limited production scale without sticking to the ideal of scale supremacy,
developing creative products aimed at a specific niche market. The ability of
building the power to develop dynamic new products one after another with
a short lead-time, and flexible production systems which can be adapted for
different types and quantities.
  Currently, globalization of the automobile industry is proceeding in two
directions. One is adopting a strategy based on scale of economies and the
other is adopting a strategy of maintaining a flexible production system that
can respond to any changes.
  As seen in the previous chapters, expansion of scale merit through mergers
and cooperation surely brings an increase in production number per
platform and reduced costs for component supplies. The problem however is
that these points are not always accompanied by increased development
ability which guarantees improvements in product quality. There is also no
guarantee that individual identity, as distinctive product architecture will
remain after reducing the number of platforms. It is also possible for
individual manufacturers with annual production of around 1 million to
reduce the number of platforms and to adopt common platforms in their own
way. Narrowing the number of component manufacturers and the move
toward modularity can be carried out to meet demand through cooperation
among networks of middle-sized automobile manufacturers even without
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mergers. An excessive move toward modularity, i.e. large-scale sub-
assembly, will weaken the attraction of products and make automobiles
standard products like personal computers. The charm of the product will
disappear.
  Another consideration is the current diversification of needs and drastic
changes in the automobile market. Competition in product development will
heat up and quicker development will be required with the increased use of
electronic information in automobile design architecture for environmental,
safety and ITS countermeasures. In actuality, shortening development
times is already proceeding, and recently, 12 to 18 months timeframe is in
the picture.  Thus a simple scale merit theory does not fully explain how this
matches diversification and speed of change in the market. Competitiveness
with superior quality products cannot be guaranteed by just increasing
output (7).  In order to correspond to market diversification and speed of
change, new production systems which make flexible production and
suitable quantities possible will be a key. Scale merit is not the only way.
Flexible production can be seen in the just in time (JIT) system traditionally
carried out by Japanese automobile manufacturers and shortening of the
production line and appropriate use of production processes creates
production lines which can correspond to changes of quantity as well as
type.
  At present, reduction of supply capacity is proceeding and shortening of
production lines is being planned. Japanese automobile manufacturers are
pursuing flexible production and trying to create flexible production lines to
adjust the rate of operations at plants or on production lines. The newest
production lines at Toyota Shimoyama engine plant and Honda Suzuka
plant are good examples.
  As a case study, let’s look at the new line at the Shimoyama Engine
Factory (8).  Toyota’s Shimoyama engine plant was established as the main
plant equivalent to the Kamisato Plant in 1975.  Since then the plant has
manufactured 25 million engines and now they support engine plants
overseas in Britain, North America and Thailand.  New challenges to
manufacture a different line of engines is taking place at this plant by
starting a new line to manufacture 30,000 ZZ-type engines per month at the
Shimoyama Plant.  The new challenge is to add flexibility and shorten the
production lead-time for the lightweight fuel efficient engine production
system. This engine uses a 4-cylinder, 1800-cc front intake rear exhaust and
has an aluminum casting liner.  Up to this point, flexibility meant to handle
the variation changes within the same type of machine.  The main
characteristic of this new production aims to apply flexibility to handle
design modifications as well as production fluctuations, in other words,
flexibility to handle quantity.
  Plant side explanations for this new challenge it is difficult to secure a
stable amount of production due to the stagnant domestic demand, because
engine manufacturing is being transferred overseas.  Thus, they aim to
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organize the process to absorb fluctuations as much as possible even if they
cannot “just fit” production fluctuations.  They promoted a “no more transfer
machine” process and eliminated CIM (computer integrated manufacturing)
processes that can handle the mass production but requires more than a
certain amount of production to avoid the production being rigid.
  To handle crank and camshaft processing, they lined up the general-use
machines and adopted a single shaft NC, and to handle block and cylinder
head processing, they used multiple lines, four lines for example.  This
means that the conventional CIM and production processes with transfer
machines put weight on the increased production.  Because this additional
cost almost doubled the initial investment, they now try to absorb the effects
by reducing the production amounts at the production lines to eliminate
additional investment cost.  In addition, by establishing multiple lines, they
can handle the production amount fluctuations.  By having multiple lines,
they can terminate operations in extreme cases, maybe one or two lines,
when they have only 70% of the total processing they can concentrate the
operators to the remaining lines. This can shorten the assembly and process
lead-time and improve operability.
  The production engineering management department at the design
development phase investigated establishment of the new lines.  The plant
side participated in giving suggestions that are reflected in the early design
development phase regarding the reliability and assembly relative to the
operations and processes.
  In order to maintain high productivity with this process while still
accommodating the production fluctuations and guarantee quality
throughout the lines it is crucial to train and mature operators by this
process rotation.  Because this will enable them to be allocated to different
processes and accommodate quantitative fluctuations.  However, it is very
difficult to rotate them through all the processes, thus they divide the
process into three zones and learn different types of processes.  These three
zones are box related such as blocks and heads, shaft related processing
such as cranks and rods, and assembly processing.
  By implementing these mentioned methods, they are hoping to handle
operability fluctuations at 70-100% levels by creating flexible lines that can
handle design modifications and production quantity fluctuations.  Thus,
depending on the capacity, they may terminate equipment, such as presses
as an example.  They are also considering the possibility to establish a
module structure of equipment, to use the terminated equipment for
another purpose on another line.  This type of line structure has also been
adopted in other companies in Japan.  Now Ford is participating in this
challenge, which eventually will determine the direction of flexibility
pursuit in the global competition.
  This movement, to pursue production of various models in different
quantities and process flexibility, is linked to the shortening of product
development time and preparation time for mass-production as well as front
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loading (9) (Solving problems in advance during the trial process). At the
same time, there are some common aspects with limited small-scale
production. Equipment investment will be less than that for existing
production lines and yearly production limits will be established. This then
unavoidably pushes manufacturers to work on plants and production
systems which can make a profit even with annual production at 50,000, or
even 10,000 when needed. Honda is now carrying out an experimental trial
in Turkey.
  Large-scale international alliances or entering the 4 million units-per-year
clubs are not the only strategies for survival in the automobile industry in
this global era. Even with these large-scale alliances, results depend on
whether or not there is a true synergistic effect through making the best use
of the partners brand value and manufacturing characteristics. Examples of
unsuccessful endeavors in the past include the merger between BMW,
Rover, and that between Renault and AMC. The conclusion is that the way
to survive includes adopting flexible production systems while forming
flexible and diversified networks of cooperation, even if the scale is small (10).
  Such necessary global strategies are common for global automakers but
substance and the methods of operation are not the same.  Thus, pursuing
scale economy by alliances and ventures just to match up numbers will not
be sufficient to accommodate the rapid changes of the automobile
technologies. There is a diverse and rapidly changing market to meet
consumers needs.  The capability to pursue the dynamic product
development capability, flexible production systems to accommodate such
development and possibly the production systems of various models and
quantities is inevitable.  Matching numbers of the scale economy does not
develop global strategies that are sufficient enough to survive the global
competition.  Effective global strategies must include the capability with
value contents to handle changes accurately and promptly.  The founder of
the modern global strategies, Ford, did not pursue only the scale merits to
standardize the platform or to supply components globally.  They rather
progressed with their global strategies with careful considerations of global
contents and the value side by focusing on the compatibility of the products
in the community and agility of the business operations.  It is not smart to
pursue the scale for individual purposes.  However, it is important to receive
the scale merits as a result of the establishment of value contents such as
product identity and capability to handle changes.
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4. The direction of global structural change in the auto
component industry
While assembler-level manufacturers in the automobile industry push
forward with restructuring efforts and global strategies, that same wave of
globalization and the structural changes that result from it are rolling
through the automobile components industry where local business
structures and systems differ from country to country. These structural
changes are being caused in part by the expanded global outsourcing that
automobile manufacturers have marked as a pillar move in their global
development strategies. Another driving factor behind the structural
changes is the globalization of the automobile components suppliers
themselves who are integrating, merging and building network tie-ups on
their own accord as well as stepping into the driver's seat with globalization
strategies of their own. Then, there is the fact that these two trends are
interrelated and fueling one another's evolution.
  Though automobile components industries around the world are
restructuring because of the expanded global outsourcing of automobile
manufacturers in general, western automakers are leading the trend in
reducing their herd of suppliers. Table 2 gives the sales ranking of the
world's top component suppliers, but what should be noticed here is how
much the rankings have changed from 1995 to 1997. Attention should also
be given to the brisk activity in mergers and acquisitions amongst
automobile component manufacturers (see Table 3), for the links they have
to this sales ranking. This outsourcing squeeze appeared first in the west
particularly because of moves from the Big 3, but the targets of the
automobile manufacturers and the processes they used to achieve those
targets have promoted mergers and acquisitions amongst components
manufacturers and led to the emergence of global suppliers.
But, what exactly are automobile manufacturers targeting by reducing
their number of suppliers and what kind of process are they using? It is well
known that there were distinct differences between the components
procurement systems historically practiced in the west and that of Japan. In
America, most of the components were made in-house in what is referred to
as one kind of internal vertical system. Europe, on the other hand, used few
in-house components choosing instead a horizontal relationship in
Table 2  Worldwide Sales Ranking of Automobile
Component Manufacturers
Worldwide
Sales Regional Business Ratio ‘97
Sales Ranking 1996 1997
North
Americ
a Europe Asia Other
 97  96  95 Company Name ($mn) ($mn) (%) (%) (%) (%)
 1  1  1 Delphi Automotive Systems 26,000 26,600 75 15  5  5
 2  2  4 Visteon Automotive Systems 16,400 17,000 85 15
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 3  3  2 Robert Bosch Corp. 16,300 16,500 20 71
 4  4  3 Denso Corp. 13,000 13,104 18  5 76  2
 5  5  19 Aisin Seiki Co.  7,790  7,790  9  7 82  2
 6  9  16 Lear Corp.  6,249  7,343 68 26  6
 7  8  17 Johnson Controls Inc.  5,942  7,280 68 29  1  2
 8  7  5 TRW Inc.  6,493  7,032 50 42  3  5
 9  14  14 Dana Corp.  5,450  6,217 80 12  2  6
 10  20 Magna International  4,200  5,500 68 20
 11  12  6 Delco Electronics Corp.  5,350  5,350 81
 12  15  7 ITT Automotive  5,500  5,200 50 50
 13 Bridgestone Corp.  4,756  5,146 30 14 48  8
 14  10  13 Valeo SA  4,600  5,000 22 74  3  1
 15  6  20 Lucas Varity Plc.  5,100  4,471 40 50  5  5
 16  17  15 Mannesmann AG  4,153  4,332 82
 17 Magnetti Marelli SpA  3,863  4,290  4 80 16
 18 Bertrand Faure ECIA     4,000 95
 19  13  11 Groupe Michelin  3,620  3,980 32 54  8  6
 20  21  12 ZF Fiedrichshafen AG  3,937  3,800 78
 21  25  24 Eaton Corp.  3,025  3,552 82
 22  23 GKN Plc.  3,423  3,381 66
 23 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.  3,370  3,360 50 24 12 14
 24  19  18 Thyssen Budd Automotive GmbH  3,300  3,300 66 30  4
 25 Meritor Automotive Inc.  3,100  3,300 40 45
Source: Automotive News prepared by Bearing Holding Company
Reproduced in part by author
US Big 3 have changed their purchasing strategies significantly since 1990.  This movement is to
select the primary component manufactures to establish the supply chain without capitalistic
relationships.  This allows them to establish the system to expedite outsourcing, promote unit's
process, develop, and deliver on global bases.
M&A among North American automobile component manufacturers continue.  For example, a body
and engine related component manufacturer, Dana, is planning a merger with Ericson in 2000
following the 1997 merger with Echlin.  There will be a giant company exceeding 13 billion dollars.
By merging with Ericson, which has the strong brand presence for the repair components, they can
disperse the risk in the reciprocal market and stabilize the incoming cash flow.
     Table 3  M&A of the Automobile Component Industry
Automobile component manufacturers are already in action.
Date Country Initiating Company Description Country
Non-initiating
Company
94.5 USA Foamex International Acquisition USA JPS Automotive
95.4 Norway Walbro Automotive Acquisition USA Dyno Ind. fuel system div.
96.6 UK Lucas Industries Merger USA Varity Corp.
95.11 USA Tenneco Automotive Acquisition USA Psefection Automotive
Products
95.11 USA Johnson Controls Acquisition France Roth Freres S.A.
95.11 USA Dana Corp. Acquisition UK GKN
95.11 USA Dana Corp. Acquisition Brazil Rockwell do Brazil
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95.8 USA Lear Seating Corp. Acquisition USA Automotive Industries Holding
95 USA TRW Acquisition South America Safety Transport Inter
96 USA Borg-Warner Automotive Acquisition France Societe de L’Usine de laMarque
96.2 USA Dana Corp. Acquisition Argentina Chassis, Piston ring
95.3 USA T&N Acquisition France Sintertech S.A.
95.3 Germany Budd Acquisition USA Resin Business ofComplax Components
96.2 USA Dana Corp. Acquisition USA Business Department ofSPX Corp.
96.2 USA Dana Corp. Acquisition USA Clark-Hurth Components
97.3 USA Lear Corp. Acquisition Czechoslovakia Acquired Empetek
Autodily from ERPE
97.6 USA Lear Corp. Acquisition UK Acquired Dunlop Coxfrom BTR
97.6 USA Lear Corp. Acquisition Germany Automobile SeatBusiness of Keiper
97.7 USA Dana Corp. Acquisition USA Axle and BreakBusiness of Eaton Corp.
97.8 USA Lear Corp. Acquisition USA Seat Components ofITT Automobile
97.9 USA Eatin Corp. Acquisition USA Clutch Business ofDana Corp.
97.9 Canada Magna International Acquisition Germany
Plastic Interior and
Exterior Decoration
Department of YMOS
97.7 USA GM Delphi Acquisition Poland Febryka AmortyzatorowS.A.
97.8 USA Lear Corp. Acquisition USA ITT Inductries
97.8 Germany Siemens AG Share increase USA Ford
97.8 USA Lear Corp. Acquisition Germany Keiper Car SeatingGmbH & Co.
97.9 USA GM Delphi Disposal by Sale To be determined Spin off of theunprofitable department
97.9 USA Magna Partial Acquisition USA GM Delphi
97.9 USA Micronas Partial Acquisition USA ITT Industries
97.9 USA Textron Acquisition UK General Rubber Goods
Department (Pirelli)
97.9 Canada Magna International Acquisition Germany Ymos AG’s plasticproducts division
97.9 USA Eaton Business Transfer USA Dana
97.10 USA Federal-Mogul Acquisition USA T&N
97.10 USA Tenneco Acquisition Argentina Fric-Rot
97.11 USA Delphi Automotive Systems USA Delco Electronics
97.12 France Ecia (PSA Peugeot Citroen) Acquisition France Bertrand Faure
98.2 USA Walton Johnson Group Partial Acquisition USA Delphi Automotive Systems
98.5 USA Dana Corp. Merger USA Echlin Inc.
Note: The indicated dates are when the related articles are published but not the accurate merger or
acquisition date.
Source: Ward's Automobile Report and extracts from companies' press releases.
Reproduced in part by author
supply and business with suppliers (11).  Though American and European
automobile makers differed on the point of internal manufacturing ratios.
They were similar in the fact that they both used numerous component
suppliers and numerous miscellaneous components. Even American
companies, which used a high percentage of internally manufactured
components, far-outdistanced Japanese automobile manufacturers in the
number of suppliers they retained. Take for example GM with 6,000
suppliers or Ford with 2,000 and compare that with the rough 200 primary
suppliers of a Japanese company. The same goes for European
manufacturers: they used many suppliers.
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  The components business of western automobile manufacturers
emphasized more than anything else cost evaluation on a short-term tender
base. Because of the competitive bidding, component suppliers were
changing constantly. Also, with exception to fuel pumps made by Bosch or
transmissions made by Borg-Warner, functional components and system
components were completely designed, developed, tested and assembled by
the automobile manufacturer himself, with no information being released
outside of the company whatsoever. More than anything else, these
practices have influenced the ongoing structural changes in the component
supplies industry, meaning that the current outsourcing squeeze is the
result of changes in traditional components business practices used in the
west. In other words, western automobile manufacturers are changing their
component procurement practices and are now asking suppliers to deliver
components as systems and units. Moreover, manufacturers are evaluating
suppliers for the design strength; development strength and engineering
solutions needed to supply these systems and units, and additionally
shifting their focus from inspected delivery to quality assurances from the
supplier's end.
  From our position, it looks to some degree like the west is copying Japan in
hopes of infusing the stability of Japan's vertical pyramid and doing
business through affiliations. However, it has cost conventional automobile
manufacturers time and money to reorganize their purchasing departments
and form cooperative groups. In any case, an information revolution has
emerged on the tailwind of these structural changes. That is to say, because
manufacturers are building a database of suppliers and a system for
benchmarking quality, cost, delivery and engineering, they can at a glance
know the capabilities and hidden potential of suppliers, a task that had left
them groping around in the dark before. Hence, supplier integration and
reduction have progressed a clearer policy. And, the database of suppliers
and the benchmarking system are not just being built for a single country
but on a global base (12).
  These structural changes have naturally invited dynamic mergers between
component suppliers around the world. But, what should be noted is that
these mergers do not merely target expansion, but restructuring that can
boost the suppliers' design and development strength and system-building
capabilities. In essence, the restructuring we are seeing amongst
components suppliers is not led by the automobile manufacturers but is the
suppliers' own attempt at global integration.
When the term "global outsourcing" was coined, manufacturers were trying
to solve the falsehood, that volume components of a car such as electronic
components had to be procured and supplied on a country base (13).
Whatever the conclusion, it came to be a core element of global outsourcing
which everyone identifies with today that suppliers also (since development
and engineering strengths were being stressed) have to be capable of
exchanging CAD/CAM and CAF data on a global scale. They have to
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incorporate their potential as the best location and best supplier in their
own global strategy. What this means, as Ryoichi Hara has pointed out, is
that suppliers not only require the design ability that allows them to
participate in development under the approved country system. The ones
the automobile manufacturers have laid down as their basic policies on
development, but also the ability to propose basic development concepts.
Things have turned out this way because automobile manufacturers need to
focus development resources on advanced and basic technology in areas
such as the environment and ITS (14).
  As restructuring continues along these lines in the global component
industry, modularization is becoming a keyword in global components.
Modularization was originally introduced in Europe, especially by German
automobile manufacturers, as a means for overcoming the high cost of labor
and procurement that their own horizontal supply business created with the
numerous number of components they had to deal with. The actual
beginning came with model plants that these manufacturers built in
developing countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America, where
modularization was first adopted. Watching this, global suppliers like Boost,
Delphi and Visteon, who had their targets set on global business expansion,
jumped on the design and development bandwagon and came up with a
proposal to strategically use modular components. This constituted a
completely different perspective of the assembler leadership that existed to
date. One after one, western manufacturers constructively adopted this
approach, and this marked the start of a link between so-called "global
outsourcing" and components modularization.
  Japanese automobile manufacturers were generally circumspect of the
trend. This was because the procurement system they had with domestic
component suppliers was viewed as the most efficient in the entire world.
They decided that there was no urgent need to promote modularization
because primary suppliers were taking part in simultaneous engineering,
modularization was progressing with procured competence and sideline
delivery was becoming a custom with system components. They additionally
pointed out that modular components would place restrictions on individual
designs, for which they found it hard to put modularization before the
vehicle.
  Nonetheless, in the past few years, they have given modularization a
second look and a trend can be seen in those actually trying to introduce it.
One reason for this is that the growing need to introduce modular
components came at an opportune time when manufacturers had to deal
with recycling and low fuel-consuming vehicles for the sake of the
environment, and develop a next generation vehicle based on ITS. Another
reason why Japanese manufacturers are changing their stance is that
effective results are starting to show from western manufacturers who
constructively introduced modularization.  Design restrictions are being
lifted somewhat on the design work for modularization thanks to
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improvements in the digital design techniques and advances in
architectural design.  Modularization is making it possible not only to
reduce the number of component suppliers but also to greatly reduce costs,
using inventions that divide and link suppliers and assemblers by their
specialties.
  Japanese manufacturers are today promoting modularization by helping
suppliers design doors, internal panels and other components, while
providing them with technical guidance along the production line. At the
same time, they are promoting modularization in the design stage. As
topics, what they need to do more than anything else is to improve their
design capabilities and strength (15).
  On this point, Masataka Ikeda feels that Japanese automobile
manufacturers are greatly interested in modularization on the development
level "as a wider range of development outsourcing". He cites the following
reasons: [1] large cost reductions and the creation of added-value from
business that is done on a modular base, [2] reduced development burden
for the assembler, [3] the possibility of coming up with something innovative
despite the fact that Japan is behind the west in modularization, and [4] the
necessity to prepare for the eventuality that Japanese components
manufacturers will be unable to participate as suppliers as western
automobile manufacturers shift from ordering components to ordering
modules. Ikeda adds that, at the present time, European component
suppliers outperform their Japanese cohorts in their ability to propose
modular products. This should come as a warning to Japanese component
manufacturers. It will determine both whether they need to form strategic
alliances and whether they can (16).
  The Japanese suppliers, who have enjoyed the advantages of traditional
subsidiary business, are affected by this structural change in the global
automobile industry.  The global sourcing development has brought the
same type strategies to the automakers.  Two trends can be seen among the
automakers.  One is to strengthen the relationship with their subsidiary
suppliers.  The other is to evaluate suppliers based on the systems
integration and the ability for a modular structure to go beyond subsidiary
relationships and their ability to aggressively propose technologies.  These
two movements are not necessarily one or the other; but rather the
suppliers are expected to be global suppliers with high technological
abilities.  As an overall trend, global subsidiary businesses are becoming
networked businesses and the business structure is changing to be more
dynamic, actually free from nationalities.  Among these movements,
Japanese suppliers are in the middle of deciding to be primary global
suppliers or secondary global suppliers utilizing the own technologies.  This
suggests that the future changes of the initiative taking be in the subsidiary
businesses, such as global module trends, assembler-initiating
reorganization or global supplier-initiated reorganization.
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5. Conclusion
Automobile and component industries worldwide have gotten into the global
age.  By the D-C alliance and the global alliance between Nissan and
Renault these have created a common view that suggests that the alliance
era for the worldwide automobile industries are aiming to join the 4 million-
unit club.  But the actual point is that the global strategies have been put in
the spotlight in the global era, and pursuing the individual purposes by joint
ventures and alliances for scale advantage is not everything in a global
strategy.  Joint ventures and alliances are not the only absolute choice for
global strategies, or the final answer to the global automobile industry
reorganization.  They must keep in mind, that the joint venture to merely
match numbers will possibly create the risk of being larger scale rather than
larger number scale advantaged.  In the case of the D-C alliance, they
considered the survival risk in this global era and stressed mutual support
by product and region.  They cannot expect a standardized platform, which
could be expected after the analysis of the economical advantage by global
sourcing.  What is important is not to stress only the scale in numbers but
the ability to develop products that play a core role in this competition.  The
competition among automakers is centered on the production systems and
components supply strategies that handle the developed products, and also
the creation of brand identity through marketing.  The pursuit of valuable
competitiveness can be brought about in their ability to plan daring and
dynamic product architectures. The ability to create a product identity,
pursue the production systems, components supply systems and production
systems of various models in different quantities to accommodate the rapid
changes of the social environment and to market these needs promptly and
with flexibility.
  In Ford's case, it has made the first move among the worldwide
automakers in the planning and implementation of a global strategy. They
did not start by merely matching numbers but stressed the flexible and
prompt handling of the local market changes and differences while
advocating a world-car plan.  Ford implemented platform standardization
and a world engine series in module production for Ford North America,
Ford Europe, Matsuda and Jaguar for the pursuit of an economic
advantage.  On the other hand, each company within the group is trying to
pursue an economic advantage based on an operational focus.  Matsuda is
working on its ability to produce various models in different quantities, but
Matsuda's hardest job will be to secure its product identity.  It is necessary
to focus on the fact that it is not merely matching numbers.  We must
remember that platform integration and global components supply would be
meaningless unless the product value comes along with it.
  Japanese auto and component makers have provided us with lessons for
the production of various models and quantities.  There are many Japanese
automakers, why not start joint ventures to match numbers.  Because even
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the manufacturers with annual production levels of about 1 million units,
have their own products and identities of their production technology. The
joint ventures for the purpose of number matching without a certain level of
identity of the design and the production ability, which creates the niche
markets, are meaningless.  The qualitative gap of such management
systems and product identity of individual automakers suggests that the
possibility for a network type alliance.  For example, utilizing each product
identity but still using global collaborative ordering of parts and components
is not just a dream.   All of these things are depending on the collaborative
development and mutual use of platforms and components with overseas
manufacturers and the progress of the module structuring.  It does not have
to be in the form of a joint venture to pursue economic advantages, but
through network type alliances with core abilities for development and
product identity.
  There are some discussion points raised for the structural change of the
global components industry.  Expansion of the global sourcing by
automakers and the integration of the global suppliers to accommodate this
expansion seems to be expecting the economic advantage.  When we think
about the dynamic changes such as environmental compliance by the
automobile component technology, from electronic to information system
integration, fuel cell and ITS handling, the important point is how to utilize
the element technology and the unique core technology of the suppliers.
Once again, the ability for the development, proposal of technologies and
dynamic system integration to utilize such abilities is questioned.  We must
remember that the pursuit of the economic advantage from the M&A and
joint ventures themselves without the value contents are not sufficient as a
competitiveness of suppliers in this global age.  Reconstruction Al change of
the components industry does not proceed by merely matching numbers by
joint venture reorganizations to reduce the number of suppliers.  Creativity
to develop architecture of component designs and independence to
supplement areas they are lacking.   Strategic and network alliances will be
required of the suppliers.  We must focus on the fact that the structural
changes of the global components supply and supply systems proceeds with
a dynamic change in value beyond economic advantages, subsidiaries
relationships and national boarders
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